THE INVASION OF AUSTRIA
From the Nuremberg Trial
The invasion of Austria was a pre-meditated aggressive step in furthering the plan to wage aggressive wars against other countries. As a result Germany's flank was protected, that of Czechoslovakia being greatly weakened. The first step had been taken in the seizure of " Lebensraum"; many new divisions of trained fighting men had been acquired; and with The seizure of foreign exchange reserves, the re-armament programme had been greatly strengthened.
On the 21st May, 1935, Hitler announced in the Reichstag that Germany did not intend either to attack Austria or to interfere in her internal affairs. On the 1st of May, 1936, he publicly coupled Czechoslovakia with Austria in his avowal of peaceful intentions; and so late as the 11th July, 1936, he recognised by treaty the full sovereignty of Austria.
Austria was in fact seized by Germany in the month of March, 1938. For a number of years before that date, the National Socialists in Germany had been cooperating with ,the National Socialists of Austria with the ultimate object of incorporating Austria into the German Reich. The Putsch of July 25th, 1934, which resulted in the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss, had the seizure of Austria as its object; but the Putsch failed, with the consequence that the National Socialist Party was outlawed in Austria. On the 11th July, 1936, an agreement was entered into between the two countries, Article 1 of which stated:
" The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federated State of Austria in the spirit of the pronouncements of the German Fuehrer and Chancellor of the 21st May, 1935."
Article 2 declared:
" Each of the two Governments regards the inner political order (including the question of Austrian National Socialism) obtaining in the other country as an internal affair of the other country, upon which it will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence."
The National Socialist movement in Austria however continued its illegal activities under cover of secrecy; and the National Socialists of Germany gave the Party active support. The resulting " incidents " were seized upon by the German National Socialists as an excuse for interfering in Austrian affairs. After the conference of the 5th November, 1937, these " incidents " rapidly multiplied. The relationship between the two countries steadily worsened, and finally the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg was persuaded by the defendant von Papen and others to seek a conference with Hitler, which took place at Berchtesgaden on the 12th February, 1938. The defendant Keitel was present at the conference, and Dr. Schuschnigg was threatened by Hitler with an immediate invasion of Austria. Schuschnigg finally agreed to grant a political amnesty to various Nazis convicted of crime, and to appoint the Nazi Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior and Security with control of the Police.
On the 9th March, 1938, in an attempt to preserve the independence of his country, Dr. Schuschnigg decided to hold a plebiscite on the question of Austrian independence, which was fixed for the 13th March, 1938. Hitler, two days later, sent an ultimatum to Schuschnigg that the plebiscite must be withdrawn. In the afternoon and evening of the 11th March, 1938, the defendant Goering made a series of demands upon the Austrian Government, each backed up by ,the threat of invasion. After Schuschnigg had agreed to the cancellation of the plebiscite, another demand was put forward that Schuschnigg must resign, and that the defendant Seyss-Inquart should be appointed Chancellor. In consequence, Schuschnigg resigned, and President Miklas, after at first refusing ,to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, gave way and appointed him.
Meanwhile Hitler had given the final order for the German troops to cross the border at dawn an the 12th of March and instructed Seyss-Inquart to use formations of Austrian National Socialists to depose Miklas and to seize control of the Austrian Government. After the order to march had been given to the German troops, Goering telephoned the German Embassy in Vienna and dictated a telegram in which he wished Seyss-Inquart to send to Hitler to justify the military action which had already been ordered.
It was:
" The provisional Austrian Government, which, after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, considers its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request to support it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose it asks the German Government to send German troops as soon as possible."
Keppler, an official of the German Embassy, replied:
" Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but everything is quiet."
After some further discussion, Goering stated:
" Please show him (Seyss-Inquart) the text of the telegram, and do tell him that we are asking him- well, he doesn't even have to send the telegram. All he needs to do is to say 'Agreed'."
Seyss-Inquart never sent the telegram; he never even telegraphed " Agreed."
It appears that as soon as he was appointed Chancellor, some time after 10 p.m., he called Keppler and told him to call up Hitler and transmit his protests against the occupation. This action outraged the defendant Goering, because "it would disturb the rest of the Fuehrer, who wanted to go to Austria the next day." At 11.15 p.m. an official in the Ministry of Propaganda in Berlin telephoned the German Embassy in Vienna and was told by Keppler: "Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees."
At daybreak on the 12th March, 1938, German troops marched into Austria, and met with no resistance. It was announced in the German press that Seyss-Inquart had been appointed the successor to Schuschnigg, and the telegram which Goering had suggested, but which was never sent, was quoted to show that Seyss-Inquart had requested the presence of German troops to prevent disorder. On the 13th March, 1938, a law was passed for the union of Austria in the German Reich. Seyss-Inquart demanded that President Miklas should sign this law, but he refused to do so, and resigned his office. He was succeeded by Seyss-Inquart, who signed the law in the name of Austria. This law was then adopted as a law of the Reich by a Reich Cabinet decree issued the same day, and signed by Hitler and the defendants Goering, Frick, von Ribbentrop and Hess.
It was contended before the Tribunal that the annexation of Austria was justified by the strong desire expressed in many quarters for the union of Austria and Germany; that there were many matters in common between the two peoples that made this union desirable; and that in the result the object was achieved without bloodshed.
These matters, even if true, are really immaterial for the facts plainly prove that the methods employed to achieve the object were those of an aggressor. The ultimate factor was the armed might of Germany ready to be used if any resistance was encountered. Moreover, none of these considerations appear from the Hossbach account of the meetings of the 5th November, 1937, to have been the motives which actuated Hitler; on the contrary, all the emphasis is there laid on the advantage to be gained by Germany in her military strength by the annexation of Austria.
Assurances and Reassurances. The German Government did more than keep up a pretense of non-interference with Austrian groups. It employed the psychological inducement of providing assurances that it had no designs on Austria's independence. If Austria could but hope for the execution of those assurances, she could find her way clear to the granting of concessions, and obtain relief from the economic and internal pressures.
A letter from Papen, while in Berlin, to Hitler, dated 17 May 1935, indicated that a forthright, credible statement by Germany reassuring Austria would be most useful for German diplomatic purposes and the improvement of relationships between Austria and German groups in Austria (2247-PS). Papen had a scheme for pitting Schuschnigg and his Social- Christian forces against Starhemberg, the Vice-Chancellor of Austria, who was backed by Mussolini. He hoped to persuade Schuschnigg to ally his forces with the NSDAP in order to emerge victorious over Starhemberg. Papen indicated that he obtained this idea from Captain Leopold, leader of the illegal National Socialists. His letter states in part:
"*** I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnigg and his Christian-social Forces, who are opposed to a home front dictatorship, against Starhemberg. The possibility of thwarting the measures arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg should be afforded to him, in such way that he would submit the offer to the government of a definitive German-Austrian compromise of interests. According to the convincing opinion of the leader of the NSDAP in Austria, Capt. Leopold, the totalitarian principle of the NSDAP in Austria must be replaced in the beginning by a combination of that part of the Christian-elements which favors the Greater Germany idea and the NSDAP. If Germany recognizes the national independence of Austria and guarantees full freedom to the Austrian national opposition, then as a result of such a compromise the Austrian government would be formed in the beginning by a coalition of these forces. A further consequence of this step would be the possibility of the participation of Germany in the Danube pact, which
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would take the sting out of its acuteness due to the settlement of relations between Germany and Austria. Such a measure would have a most beneficial influence on the European situation and especially on our relationship with England. One may object, that Mr. Schuschnigg will hardly be determined to follow such a pattern, that he will rather in all probability immediately communicate our offer to our opponents. Of course, one should first of all explore the possibility of setting Schuschnigg against Starhemberg through the use of 'Go betweens'. The possibility exists. If Mr. Schuschnigg finally says 'No' and makes our offer known in Rome, then the situation would not be any worse but, on the contrary, the efforts of the Reich government to make peace with Austria would be revealed -- without prejudice to other interests. Therefore even in the case of refusal this last attempt would be an asset. I consider it completely possible, that in view of the far spread dislike of the Alpine countries of the pro- Italian course and in view of the sharp tensions within the federal government (Bundesreich), Mr. Schuschnigg will grasp this last straw -- always under the supposition that the offer could not be interpreted as a trap by the opponents, but that it bears all the mark of an actually honest compromise with Austria. Assuming success of this step, we would again establish our active intervention in Central European politics, which, as opposed to the French-Czech and Russian political maneuvers, would be a tremendous success, both morally and practically. Since there are 2 weeks left to accomplish very much work in the way of explorations and Conferences, an immediate decision is necessary. The Reich Army Minister (Reichswehrminister) shares the opinion presented above and the Reich Foreign Minister (Reichsaussenminister) wanted to discuss it with you my Fuehrer.
(Signed) Papen". (2247-PS)
In other words, Papen wanted a strong assurance and credible assurance, of Austria's independence. As he put it, Germany had nothing to lose with what it could always call a mere effort at peace. And she might be able to convince Schuschnigg to establish an Austrian coalition government with the NSDAP. If she did this, she would vastly strengthen her position in Europe. Finally, Papen urged haste.
Exactly four days later (21 May 1935) in a Reichstag address Hitler responded to Papen's suggestion, asserting:
"Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an Anschluss". (TC-26) [Page 469]
Despite this assurance, Papen suggested and Hitler announced, for a complexity of reasons, a policy completely at variance with their intentions, which had been and continued to be to interfere in Austria's internal affairs and to conclude an Anschluss.
(e) Temporary Countenance of a Quiet Pressure Policy. On 1 May 1936 Hitler branded as a lie any statement that tomorrow or the day after Germany would fall upon Austria. His words were published in the Voelkische-Beobachter, SD, 2-3 May 1936, p. 2. (2367-PS)
If Hitler meant what he said, it as only in the most literal and misleading sense that he would not fall upon Austria "tomorrow or the day after". For the conspirators well knew that the successful execution of their purpose required for a while longer the quiet policy they had been pursuing in Austria.
A memorandum of a conversation which occurred when William Bullitt, American Ambassador to France, called upon von Neurath, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 18 May 1936, recounts von Neurath's explanation why Germany was trying to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria (1150). The Nazis were growing stronger in Austria, anyway, in view of their appeal to the young people. And the German Government was doing nothing active in foreign affairs until the Rhineland, reoccupied two months before, had been "digested", and until fortifications were constructed on the French frontier. Finally, Italy still had a conflicting interest in Austria, and Germany wished to avoid any involvement with Italy.
(f) The agreement of 11 July 1936. But if Germany was not yet ready for open conflict in Austria, its diplomatic position was vastly improved over 1934, a fact which influenced Austria's willingness to make concessions to Germany and come to terms. As Mr. Messersmith points out, Italy, formerly a protector of Austria, had em,barked on her Abyssinian adventure, and this, together with the refortification of the Rhineland, strengthened Germany's position (1760-S). This weakening of Austria helped pave the way for the Pact of 11 July 1936. (TC-22)
The formal part of the agreement of 11 July 1936, between the German Government and the Government of the Federal State of Austria, looks like a great triumph for Austria. It contains a confusing provision to the effect that Austria, in its policy, especially with regard to Germany, will regard herself as a German state. But the other two provisions clearly state that Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of Austria, and that it regards
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the inner political order of Austria (including the question of Austrian National Socialism) as an internal concern of Austria upon which it will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence.
But there was much more substance to the day's events. Mr. Messersmith's summary, as set forth in his affidavit, is more revealing:
"Even more important than the terms of the agreement published in the official communique, was the contemporaneous informal understanding, the most important provisions of which were, that Austria would (1) appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor's confidence but friendly to Germany to positions in the Cabinet; (2) would devise means to give the 'national opposition' a role in the political life of Austria and within the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all Nazis save those convicted of the most serious offenses. This amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of the Deutsche Nationaler into the Austrian Government was accomplished by the appointment of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister Without Portfolio". (1760-PS)
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Q. Mr. Messersmith in his affidavit also refers to a document whose author he does not, however, mention. This document is alleged to have been shown him by Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg in January, 1935, and is said to reveal the substance of your conference with Hitler, Schacht and von Neurath on the occasion of your visit to Berlin. An agreement is alleged to have been made at that conference to the effect that for the next two years intervention in the internal political affairs of Austria was to be avoided. Finally Dr. Schacht is said to have made available two hundred thousand marks monthly for support of the National Socialists in Austria.
What do you say about Mr. Messersmith's statement?
A. The details given by Mr. Messersmith show that this is obviously an agent's report on my trip to Berlin received by the Austrian Foreign Minister. The contents of that report are largely incorrect. The inaccuracy of the passage referring to Dr. Schacht has already been shown by Dr. Schacht's testimony. But in that report there is something which is true. At that time there was a so-called relief fund in Austria, which was managed by a certain Herr Langott.
It has already been testified here in the witness box that this relief measure, which was intended to benefit wives and children of Austrian National Socialists who had emigrated to Germany, existed with the knowledge of the Austrian Government and police. But I neither requested Herr Schacht to make available official funds for this relief fund, nor did I myself pay out such moneys. Obviously this money originated from Party sources in Germany.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection therewith, I refer to the testimony of Glaise-Horstenau, who stated here that the Austrian Government knew of the "Langott" relief fund.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Mr. Messersmith believes that from information received from the Austrian Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg, he can reproduce the following statement made by you at the beginning of 1935:
"Yes, now you have your French and English friends, and you can have your independence a little longer."
Did you make such a statement?
A. Such a statement would have been not only extremely foolish from a diplomatic point of view, but actually impossible, because it would certainly have put an end to all diplomatic activity.
In no case could the co-operation, which Mr. Messersmith states was carried on successfully for years, or the political activity which he describes as also being
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carried on for years, have been reconciled with an open admission of this kind to the effect that I wanted Austrian independence to be of short duration only.
Q. Mr. Messersmith goes on to say in this affidavit, that you had publicly stated that you wished to get rid of certain members of the Austrian Government, among them Chancellor Schuschnigg. Is that true?
A. The contrary is true. I never aimed at the removal of Chancellor Schuschnigg; it was rather my aim to give him confidence in my policy, in the policy of reconciliation. I not only knew Herr von Schuschnigg to be an upright Austrian patriot but also a man who was far from wishing to deny his German ties, and in spite of many differences in policy, these German antecedents of his made an excellent basis for collaboration. I can ask only in addition whether a diplomat, who desires a change to come about in the government to which he is accredited, would proclaim it from the roof-tops?
Q. The prosecution have submitted a report which you made to Hitler, dated 17th May, 1935, as proof of your desire to steer Schuschnigg into a government collaborating with the National Socialists. This is Exhibit USA 64, included again in my Document book under Document 66, on Pages 159 and 160.
Witness, what were your intentions, actually?
A. I must be a little more explicit with reference to this document. This report was written eight months after the Dollfuss murder, that is, within the first two years, during which period the prosecution themselves admit that I had instructions to remain entirely passive. When this report was written we had news that Starhemberg, in conjunction with Mussolini, was pursuing a policy which would have put serious difficulties in the way of an understanding between Austria and Germany. For this reason I suggested to Hitler a drastic intervention: I proposed that Schuschnigg and the Christian Socialist elements, which were hostile to a Heimwehr dictatorship, should be played off against Starhemberg by the offer of a final agreement on German-Austrian interests. This report states that if Germany were to recognize the national independence of Austria and were to undertake to refrain from influencing the opposition in Austria, by which I meant the Nazis, a coalition between these factions would be bound to result. The consequence would be that Germany would participate in the Danube agreement, which would be tantamount to a peaceful solution of the entire European situation.
Q. You have just explained that you were pursuing an honest policy of balancing interests?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal would like to understand more clearly what the defendant means by what he has just said.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I have just been told that the translation came over very badly; the English translation is said to have come through very badly. Would you suggest, Mr. President, that the defendant repeat the entire answer?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, most certainly. That is the best way. I think it is very likely that the English translation came over badly.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Witness, will you please repeat your answer but rather more slowly so that the interpreters will have no difficulty?
A. When this report was written, we had news that Starhemberg - Starhemberg was the chief of the Heimwehr - wanted to link himself with Mussolini in a policy which would be hostile in future to any Germanophile tendencies in Austria. In order to counter Prince Starhemberg's manoeuvre, I advised Hitler to suggest to Schuschnigg that, instead of forming a coalition with the Heimwehr, he should do so with the Christian Socialist elements, who were not opposed to a reconciliation of Germany with Austria. In order to induce him to enter into such a coalition, Hitler was to offer Schuschnigg a final settlement of German and Austrian interests. In other words, Hitler was to tell him that Germany would recognize the national independence of Austria and would undertake not to interfere in future in the internal affairs of Austria.
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And I went on to say to Hitler that if we achieved this pacification and established good and friendly relations with Austria, we could even join in the Danube Pact. This was the combination of the French, the Italians, and the Czechoslovaks, who were always in favour of a pact of the Danube Powers, including Austria. We in Germany had opposed the policy of those Powers at the time, because we feared that if Austria joined a Danube Pact, she would be estranged from Germany once and for all. If, on the other hand, we were on good terms with Austria and friendly relations were established again, we could, as I pointed out to Hitler, join in this Danube Pact and by this means achieve something extraordinarily constructive for the cause of European peace.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not forgetting your hopes which you expressed this morning?
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. You have just said that you pursued an honest policy of co-ordination of interests.
Is it true that you persuaded Hitler to make a statement in favour of Austria's independence in his Reichstag speech on 21st May, 1936?
A. Yes, that is perfectly true, because that statement was the prerequisite for any normal settlement of interests in a revolutionary way; for our joint policy could only be advanced by Austria. Austria had been ordered by the peace, treaty of St. Germain and the protocol of Geneva to remain aloof from Germany. If Austria, therefore, were to take the initiative and improve her relations with Germany, it was essential that we should first recognize her sovereignty.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I draw your attention to a mistake in the translation. In the English translation the words "revolutionary way" should read "evolutionary way."
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Will you please comment on the pact of 11th July, 1936?
A. The agreement of 11th July has been described by Sir David as a deceptive manoeuvre and an attempt to get the Austrian Government into new difficulties, to undermine it by introducing men of pro-German sympathies, like Glaise-Horstenau or Foreign Minister Schmidt. This judgement passed upon the pact is entirely incorrect, and I think historically untenable; and I believe that that has been proved by examinations here and the statements of the Austrian Foreign Minister.
The pact was the result of my efforts over two years to re-establish normal relations between the sister nations. The agreement was desired by both governments, not by the German Government only, and Chancellor Schuschnigg admitted that himself, as mentioned in a report of mine, dated 1st September, 1936, on a speech made by Schuschnigg to Austrian workers. Why should the Austrian Government have concluded this pact? It was not compelled to conclude it, unless it wanted to bring about normal, friendly relations with the German Reich.
For that very reason I had asked Hitler to proclaim Austrian sovereignty in his Reichstag speech. That agreement was certainly not intended to imply our willingness to give up the idea of union at a later date, which we wanted, but it acknowledged Austria's full independence of action. But the aim of union of the two States was now to be pursued in a regular and evolutionary manner.
This corresponded with the agreement which I had made with Hitler on 26th July. There was a second part to that agreement which was not published. It contained all the elements necessary for pacification - an amnesty, the regulation of our Press relations and the lifting of the so-called "1,000 mark bar." This was a frontier bar imposed by Hitler's decree upon people travelling into Austria. Any German wishing to go to Austria at that time had to pay 1,000 marks. This bar was removed. Herr Schuschnigg, for his part, promised in this unpublished part of the agreement that men in his confidence, who were members of the national
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opposition, were to be drawn in to co-operate in Austria. It appeared to us that the inclusion of the Austrian opposition in Austrian parliamentary procedure was an essential condition for any further peaceful solution. In other words, the ban against the Party was gradually to be relaxed.
Mr. Messersmith, if I may add, stated incorrectly in his affidavit:
"Part II of this pact contained a clause that a number of persons who were in the Chancellor's (Hitler's) confidence should be called to positions in the cabinet."
That, obviously, is a mistaken conclusion on Mr. Messersmith's part, because we were not concerned with people who had Hitler's confidence, but with those who had Schuschnigg's confidence. This was an agreement made by Schuschnigg. Apart from this, Mr. Messersmith says with reference to this agreement:
"The first penetration of German nationals into the Austrian Government was achieved through the nomination of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs."
This is entirely wrong. Dr. Schmidt was an Austrian and directed Austrian policy; he represented Austrian interests, as was natural, and at no time did Germany exert any influence to make him, Dr. Schmidt, Foreign Minister.
On the whole, world public opinion at that time regarded this agreement as an instrument of peace and a great step forward. It was left to the prosecution to call it a deceptive manoeuvre.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Prince Erbach's affidavit, Document 96, of the English book, Pages 233 and 234, questions 4 to 7 and questions 12 and 13, dealing with the subject which we have just discussed.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Did you, after the conclusion of the July Agreement, regard your mission in Austria as terminated?
A. Yes, I regarded it as terminated. That is proved by the resignation which I tendered to Hitler on 16th July, 1936.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 71, Page 165 of the second Document Book. I quote the beginning:
"On 26th July, 1934, you proposed to the late Field Marshal that I should be sent to Vienna on a temporary mission to restore normal and friendly relations.
"With the agreement signed on 11th July, the decisive step has been taken in this direction."
In a later part of the document, he asks to be recalled. I go on to quote the last but one paragraph:
"Even though the 'German question' will need very careful and considerate handling in the future too - especially after the incredible difficulties which have gone before - I would like now, at the end of the task you entrusted to me, to place my resignation in your hands."
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. The Prosecution have used the report you made to Hitler on 1st September, 1936, 2246-PS, and they accuse you of remaining in contact with the illegal leaders of the Austrian National Socialists, of attempting to bring that opposition into the Fatherland Front and of desiring to change the Schuschnigg regime.
A. In the report mentioned I wrote:
"In the normalization of relations to Germany, progress has been hindered by the stubbornness of the Ministry of Security, where the old anti-National-Socialist officials are located. Changes in regime are, therefore, urgently required."
The expression which I used in this report, "Changes in regime," actually means "Changes in personnel"; in that connection I also go on to say, in the
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Following sentence, that economic negotiations will follow in the near future. This shows quite clearly that these words do not refer to a removal of Schuschnigg's person. Apart from that, this report speaks of the gravity of the situation in the Danube area, and makes proposals for a peaceful solution.
If I am accused by the prosecution of having had contacts with the Nazi opposition, although the July Agreement had excluded all intervention in Austrian affairs, I must point out that I was perfectly entitled to these contacts because I was interested in ascertaining whether and how far Herr von Schuschnigg kept his promise to draw men in whom he had confidence from the nationalist opposition for collaboration. Just how far the Nazi opposition submitted to that agreement of 11th July is shown by Leopold's statement in January, 1937, which Mr. Messersmith has attached to his own affidavit.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 75, Page 171, which contains this file note of Leopold. The document is identical with Exhibit USA 57. There is an error in the English translation. In the fifth last line, on Page 1, the word "Anschluss" has been translated by "annexation."
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Witness, what do you have to say about Leopold's proposals?
A. Leopold's proposals show the following. The leaders of the Austrian Nazis fully accepted the policy of the July Agreement. They recognized that in future the question of the Anschluss would be an internal Austrian affair to be settled by the Austrian Government. They proposed that this solution should be found in an evolutionary manner by the Austrian Government and the Party. In favour of this solution is the fact that by means of the declaration of the sovereignty of Austria, these arguments could, in the future, no longer represent foreign political dangers for Austria, that is, that the agreement of July was approved of by the Austrian National Socialists, and that they were prepared to proceed in a legal way with the Austrian Government.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 18th June, 1946, at 1000 hours.)
CFPA: National Socialists are the most deceitful, lying and dishonost gang of rats who ever set foot on planet Earth, even more so than Moslems who are the most insane gang of rats.
